Here’s my second post inspired by Keith
Humphreys, this time covering the recent announcement of sobriety tags for certain
alcohol-related offenders in London.
(It’s worth noting at this point that a
similar scheme was introduced in Strathclyde some time ago, though that’s
not mentioned in the
mayoral press release.)
The rationale for the policy is explained clearly here,
but its application to a wide range of offences initially made me feel
uneasy. In the US, from what I can tell,
the schemes were run – in the first instance at least – to address drink
driving offences. Setting aside the
thorny issue of fixing an exact ‘safe’ limit of alcohol, people are not allowed
to ‘drink and drive’, and when they do the restriction has generally been of their
driving rather than their drinking.
There’s actually no reason why this shouldn’t be reversed if
it’s more effective. It’s not necessarily
true that these individuals are bad drivers when sober, just as they may hurt
no-one when they drink unless they drive.
To fully forfeit one right is no more arbitrary than forfeiting the
other, since the precise offence is the combination of drinking and
driving, not either on its own.
The requirement to stay sober fits, though, because of the
specific nature of the offence of drink driving: we have a specific, apparently
‘objective’ limit on blood alcohol concentration, over which a person is not
allowed to drive. Driving while ‘drunk’
is an offence in itself, banned on the basis that there is a direct physiological/pharmacological
relationship between alcohol consumption and impaired driving. Without the alcohol, there is, by definition,
no drink driving.
We know this is not the case for violence and other
crimes. Not everyone in every culture is
more likely to become violent or commit a crime when drunk; the
way we behave when drunk is learned and more
conscious than we might think (given that we react in similar ways when we’ve
drunk a placebo).
Combined with the way the offences are defined, this means
that we just can’t say for an individual who commits an offence while drunk –
as we can for drink driving – that without the alcohol there is no offending
(of this specific nature).
Of course the same sort of principle already underpins Drug
Rehabilitation Requirements (DRRs) or Alcohol Treatment Requirements (ATRs),
which are used as part of community sentences now, and which I’m very much in
favour of. These are handed out where
the courts feel the offending is drug- or alcohol-related. However, those should do far more than simply
stopping an individual drinking; they should look at why they drink or use
drugs and why they commit crime.
I agree with Keith Humphreys that people frequently recover
from drug and alcohol use without accessing specialist services, and this new
initiative offers them an incentive to kick start that process regardless of
any related treatment requirement, but the relationship between drinking and
offending more broadly isn’t quite so straightforward as drinking and
driving. It’s clear the scheme designers
are aware of this, as they have excluded domestic violence offences from those
listed as suitable for tagging.
I’m not against the scheme, but when it’s looked at in some
detail – it will be supervised by probation and those on the programme will be
offered alcohol advice and treatment – it’s apparent it’s not a huge
innovation, but simply a technically more effective ATR, and almost identical
to DRRs, which already involve drug testing.
To be fair to Humphreys, it’s the technical and procedural innovations
he stresses, but it’s certainly far from the revolutionary or radical
initiative some have painted it, whether in favour or opposed.
The key difference from DRRs is, of course, that those ‘drugs’
by that definition are illegal, and so it doesn’t seem so unreasonable to
require someone not to be using a particular substance. Although the
argument of the Adam Smith Institute that the tags are a novel infringement of
civil liberties falls down somewhat given that ATRs have been around for
years, perhaps what’s really highlighted is this inconsistency: we really feel
that it’s an Englishman’s right to drink beer.
And so we’re back to Virginia Berridge again: I wouldn’t
start from here. It’s maybe not helpful
to have that feeling of a right to beer, if indeed that’s what’s going on. Unfortunately, policy has to start from here. A liberal argument can be made that action
should be focused on the offences, not the alcohol, but the idea of limiting
people’s access to certain factors that influence their offending behaviour if
they tend to commit crime is pretty well established. I’ll be interested to see not just the
evaluation of the project, but whether whatever government is in power after
next year’s election feels the scheme is something it should endorse
nationally.
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