It’s hard to convey quite how frustrated I was by Sunday’s
Centre for Social Justice report on alcohol and drug treatment – and quite
how much of a gift for this blog it is.
I won’t really do it justice in this post, as there’s so many gaping
holes and misleading inaccuracies in it that I can’t begin to address them all
here.
It’s worth mentioning in passing, though, that the much-trumpeted idea of
ringfencing an allocation of alcohol tax for rehab could be
counterproductive. The likelihood is
that this would come to be seen as the funding for alcohol treatment,
meaning that current allocations might be dropped – certainly by local
authorities keen to raid public health budgets to ease the pressures of the
graph of doom.
There are two key issues I want to focus on here, based on
the prominence given to them by the press release and CSJ reps in their media
appearances.
First, that residential
rehabilitation is the only way to achieve ‘full recovery’. This sort of argument hinges on one’s
preferred definition of recovery, and the adoption of this buzzword in the 2010
Drug Strategy and subsequent Strang
Report just papered over the cracks within the sector: the ‘methadone
wars’ are far from over. As DJ Mac
suggested, the way the report is written is hardly conducive to the dialogue
and persuasion that would be required to genuinely transform drug treatment successfully.
Almost more fundamentally,
though, the report presents a conclusion without any basis in evidence. The only reference for the effectiveness of
res rehab is the
2012 NTA report The role of residential rehab in an integrated treatment system,
but this largely endorsed the position of most local authorities in using res
rehab for a minority of individuals. It
even stated: “For every ten people who go to rehab each year, three
successfully overcome their dependency, one drops out, and six go on to further
structured support in the community. Of those
six, two overcome dependency with the help of a community provider, at least
two are still in the system, and at least one drops out.” That is, res rehab is not some magic,
universal solution, and in fact often treats those who are more stable to begin
with – the most challenging and chaotic are those who drop out, and it’s
community treatment services that are left to manage them. Rehabs, the NTA report said, are better at
treating those with alcohol dependency than drug addiction – but then this is true for community
services too.
There is no doubt that even a six
month stay in a res rehab, if successful, is a better option than 10 years on
methadone in the community, but it’s not immediately clear that this is a
direct choice funders, commissioners or service users can make. As DJ Mac argued, we do need a debate about
how drug and alcohol treatment services should be organised, but it needs to be
constructive. It’s not just that the
press release was confrontational; I heard Chip Somers promoting the
report on Radio 5 (43 mins into the link) claiming that it’s basically
impossible to get state-funded rehab at present and there are waits of years. I just don’t know where this is true. There is something of a ‘postcode lottery’ in
the sense that policies will be locally-determined, but many facilities would
count up to half of their clients as state-funded, and not all local
allocations for res rehab even end up being spent. This is just not as simple as there being a local
(or national) policy block on accessing such services – and that’s if we even
accept the effectiveness of such services in the absence of clear evidence.
Second, the report makes some big
claims about drug-related deaths, which were
picked up on by the media. The first
thing to note in this respect is the big picture: whether we’re looking at
general drug poisonings or the subcategory of ‘drug misuse’ deaths, it’s very
hard to argue that we’re seeing anything approaching a crisis:
Source: ONS, 2013
(I should point out that this second graph is from the 2013 St George’s report on drug-related deaths, because this is what’s cited by
the CSJ in theirs, and that’s what I’m working from throughout the rest of this post.)
More than this, however, the analysis
given is just cherry-picking to illustrate a point. Last year, the
CSJ was concerned about the growing number of deaths involving methadone –
and this surely still underpins their opposition to opiate substitution treatment,
expressed in the latest report. What
they’re concerned to do in the report is paint drug use as a continuing major
problem despite declining use of
heroin.
NPS (new psychoactive substances)
are the particular choice for this report.
If you were cynical (unlike me) it might occur that this is a useful
focus, because it’s so difficult to predict how use of and harms from these
substances will develop in the coming years, making panic-inducing speculation
possible.
Certainly, deaths related to NPS
have increased, and the CSJ focuses on this, hence all those headlines about
NPS deaths being about to overtake heroin.
The thing is that their analysis doesn’t improve our understanding of
the situation regarding substance use in England today. In fact, it could be argued that it is
actively misleading. NPS deaths are
compared with those from heroin and morphine – but why not opiates as a whole,
if methadone-related deaths were such a concern last year? It might be suggested that pointing out the
decline in methadone-related deaths wouldn’t fit with the big narrative based
on how terrible methadone is, given that last year’s figures relating to heroin
and methadone appear to have been an anomaly.
The crucial thing to note here is
that the opiates are the single most common psychoactive drug group associated
with deaths. In fact, heroin and morphine
deaths accounted for a higher percentage of the total in 2012 than 2011 (by
5.1%).
As an aside, I’m talking about
drug-related deaths, but it’s worth pointing out that when the CSJ talks about
drugs causing deaths, they have a tendency to count the cases where
particular drugs were noted in the toxicology report, rather than where a specific
substance was listed as a cause of death.
First off, the CSJ uses just four
years of data, covering 2009 to 2012, so long-term trends might not be
apparent. More than this, though, for
their extrapolations they only look at two years compared, taking the change
from 2011 to 2012. In the timescale of
legal highs this is quite a while ago, and just one year in what could be seen
as a rapidly changing field.
I say it could be seen as a
rapidly changing field, because if the CSJ had conducted the same analysis last
year, rather than noting a 43% increase in deaths were the individual had NPS
in their system, they would have seen no change at all. Both 2010 and 2011 saw 68 post-mortem toxicology
reports citing NPS. (An increase could
have been argued if ‘cause of death’ were considered as the key variable,
however.)
You could say it would be hard to
predict next year’s figures based on a line of development like this:
That’s precisely what the CSJ
report did though, and what was picked up by the news headlines. The supposedly newsworthy comparison, as I
mentioned above, was with heroin and morphine deaths. Initially, it’s hard to see how the NPS
deaths would outstrip the others:
However, the extrapolation on one
year produces a convergence:
There’s an interesting choice
made here: the extrapolation isn’t linear; it’s exponential. That is, there’s compound interest on the
increase, such that if NPS deaths carried on increasing in this way although
the figure of 400 seems believable for 2016, it’s hard to imagine 1,166 in 2019
or 1,663 in 2020. This isn’t to say
these figures aren’t possible, but there’s no explanation as to why just one
year’s change is taken as opposed to an average over the period, and why this
is then compounded rather than treated as a linear function. The strangest thing about the whole process,
though, is that actual figures for 2013 are due out on 3rd
September. We don’t have to predict; we
can know. Why not just wait for a couple
more weeks to make the estimates more accurate?
However, there is no doubt that
whether we look at the ‘toxicology’ or ‘cause’ figures, there has been a rise
in ‘NPS’ deaths in the period. What isn’t
so clear is whether these are due to what most people would think of as ‘legal
highs’ – or indeed whether the substances would be covered by the interventions
later proposed.
The increase in toxicology
figures from 2011 to 2012 (on which that extrapolation is based) wasn’t
down to mephedrone, or anything ‘legal’.
In fact, the bulk of the increase was down to PMA. Toxicology reports citing PMA rose from 5 in
2011 to 19 in 2012. But PMA isn’t a
novel substance, having been available at least by 1970,
and a Class A
substance in the UK since the Queen’s Silver Jubilee. It
seems to generally be sold as ecstasy, so it’s not even that users understand
it to somehow be a ‘legal high’. That
is, these deaths have little or nothing to do with head shops, as far as we can
tell – and yet the recommendations of the report relating to ‘legal highs’
focus on head shops.
Another category of drug that
rose was benzofurans – from 1 to 9 – and methoxetamine – from 1 to 6. Both of these are now illegal (though in the
case of methoxetamine, only since 2013 – after the period covered by these
data).
Given that the concerns expressed
regarding ‘legal highs’ are how to police ‘head shops’, and it would be quite
straightforward to stop head shops selling any of these substances, I’m not
sure how the concerns and proposed solutions fit the identified problem. Of course, it might be that head shops
continue to pose problems, simply with a new set of drugs – but the CSJ report
would have to explain why that’s likely to be the case. It would probably need new data that
illustrate how things have developed since the banning of the relevant
substances (and indeed how banning makes any difference whatsoever, given the
apparent importance of PMA), and should acknowledge that comparing just two
years’ data isn’t the most secure basis for an extrapolation.
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