I recently read an article about gaming addiction, which inevitably got the usual questions bubbling around my head. What might this person mean by 'addiction'? What does this sort of issue have in common with 'drug addiction' or 'substance misuse'?
If we take the DSM V definition of a substance use disorder, then it's certainly possible to identify that people can play games to the detriment of family and wider relationships, personal finances, career and so on. And that the activity chosen at some level gives some kind of pleasure or release - even if by the point of dependence that's tinged with guilt or shame, or only amounts to feeling 'normal', not excited, euphoric or 'high'. That's why I'm never surprised by (or interested in) academic studies or media stories identify how particular activities, or a new substance (such as cheese), stimulate the same receptors as heroin or cocaine. That's just the body's way of saying you're getting something out of the activity.
So why bother writing about gaming 'addiction'?
Well, the key for me was this article linked this type of addiction with neoliberalism - a brilliant coming together of my two academic interests. I wouldn't disagree with the writer that lots of people in today's society or economy don't get a sense of meaning, purpose or achievement from their work or wider life. And that sense of purposelessness doesn't necessarily cause addiction or particular patterns of behaviour, but it can give less of an incentive to break them. I've just been reading Geoffrey Pearson's The New Heroin Users, and that ends on the note that it's hard to address heroin use in an neighbourhood where use of the drug is widespread and there is mass unemployment.
That unemployment of Lancashire and Yorkshire in the early to mid 1980s could be seen as a direct (even deliberate) consequence of public policy (and let's set aside the fact that the economic policy specifically might be better labelled monetarist than neoliberal). But it's not immediately clear that 'gaming' addiction is rooted in conditions or policy analogous to this form of (apparently problematic) substance use if the underlying issue is meaning (whether as a result of an unrewarding job or no job at all) or social/community and family connection.
There is certainly a tendency in social policy and related academic fields to say that Thatcherism ripped the heart out of communities, and to link this with close community identity. And such an interpretation fits with the idea that addiction is a response to a lack of purpose caused by 'neoliberal' economic policy.
The thing is that the image of close-knit communities, held together by work, didn't operate in the same way in all places. Mining villages were always exceptional in having a single employer, and even the dominance of Raleigh in Nottingham, or Ford in Dagenham didn't represent the life of most people in work under the postwar 'consensus' supposedly destroyed by Thatcher. There's a reason academics felt the need to conduct ethnography of mining villages, and the idea that 'Coal is Our Life' was a striking title for a book.
This isn't peculiarly 'neoliberal', and might have more in common with the concerns of social commentators and academics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century - people losing their community and social ties (and mores) by moving to cities to take industrial work. Think of Dickensian tales of London, or Marx's idea of alienation, or Durkheim's idea of anomie. These were seen to some extent as originating in the division of labour and the loss of traditional community purpose and solidarity particular vocations had given, along with direct, personal, mutual interdependence. The idea that interactions are based on the nexus of cash owes more to the era of Adam Smith than that of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman.
And this rings true if we think about the history of addiction or substance use. Public panics about drunkenness were often tied up with broader concerns about the lawlessness of developing industrial cities, and alcohol had a starring role in Engels' description of the hopelessness of life in industrial Manchester.
Misuse of alcohol and other drugs plays a starring role in plenty of literature of the pre-neoliberal world too, notably (though much later than Engels) in the work of Thomas Hardy (at least it's notable for someone who lives in 'Casterbridge'). And computer games hadn't been invented, so we can't find many characters 'addicted' to those. But we can find people, as in George Eliot's Silas Marner, where a key plot point revolves not so much on a person's dependence on alcohol as what might be called a 'gambling addiction' in modern parlance. Dunsey's gambling debts as much as his drinking lead him to deception and theft.
And the problems described in literature, media, or medical reports of the period don't sound so different from our own today. I wouldn't deny that public policy affects the prevalence of misuse, the harmfulness of the consequences, and how easily people can 'recover'. In fact, I've written about how neoliberalism as an ideology limits the way we approach issues of substance misuse. But if we label 'gaming' as an addiction, which I might be able to agree with, we can't really see it as a consequence of 'neoliberalism'. If we do, we risk failing to identify useful, practical solutions.
I have no doubt that many people could live a life more full of 'meaning' - and that, as shown by plenty of addiction treatment programmes, might be achieved as much through religion or philosophy as changing government economic or social policy. Perhaps it might also be solved, as Marx envisaged, by a communist revolution. Or perhaps by a return to small, self-sufficient communities as envisaged by the 'Diggers' in the seventeenth century or more recent utopian groups.
But whether that is more desirable than remaining engaged in society as we find it, tweaking our own relationship with it perhaps, and being aware and somewhat detached and cynical is a personal and philosophical question, not one where the causes of addiction are particularly relevant. (You can perhaps guess where my natural sympathy lies.)
Addiction is more a human failing than one of neoliberalism. I'm not convinced this search for meaning is something we particularly suffer with under 'neoliberalism'. In fact, neoliberalism's most vocal critics wouldn't argue that people fail to find meaning under neoliberalism; they just argue that people find it in the 'wrong' things, like consumer products. And if you're frustrated or sad that people are finding meaning in computer games or trainers, that's not an 'addiction' problem; that's a political or moral problem. It's when people aren't finding meaning or connection that we should be talking about 'addiction' rather than false consciousness.
Thursday, 21 April 2016
Wednesday, 6 April 2016
Disunity as strength
The government recently published its ‘modern’
crime prevention strategy. Apart
from the bizarre title, given that modernism makes me think more of 1916 than
2016, there’s been some concern expressed that this signifies the end of any
joint alcohol strategy. It seems that
alcohol-related crime will now be addressed through this crime prevention
strategy rather than something covering alcohol issues as a whole. And separately HMRC has
just published its own alcohol strategy in relation to tax.
As
usual, what I want to do here is raise the possibility that this actually
might be a more positive development than it at first appears. The fear from some in the field is that
without an overarching strategy for ‘alcohol’ there will be
no clear vision for action on alcohol from different government departments.
But why did I just put ‘alcohol’ in quotation marks? It’s not just because our understanding of
this topic is socially constructed – banal as that point is. It’s that actually we group together issues
under the banner of alcohol that don’t necessarily have a lot in common. I’m not convinced by this banner as a
unifying term.
Regular readers of this blog will be bored of me stating
that there is a myriad of problems associated with alcohol. And often that’s all they are – associated with,
rather than caused by,
the substance. Those who frequently
attend hospital emergency departments often have alcohol misuse disorders, but
these are generally amongst several other problems where the line of causality
isn’t obvious. The same applies to many people
in alcohol treatment. It’s not just that
seeing them as having an ‘alcohol’ issue is an incomplete picture, it can
actively be unhelpful to dissociate alcohol from the other factors in their
lives – just think of ‘dual diagnosis’
where substance misuse and mental health teams fail to work together because
they see the problem as being rooted in the other discipline. Recovery from substance misuse in lots of
ways isn’t about the substance itself so much as the ingrained behaviours
associated with it, and making sure people have the full range of appropriate
resources (‘recovery
capital’, if you will) to make effective and lasting changes to their
lives.
But more fundamentally, even if we were to accept alcohol as
at some level the root cause of certain problems, the way in which this happens –
and the way in which the people affected understand this – varies hugely. We know that people are very good at dodging
the definition of problem drinking, and this is partly because it’s always easy
to point to an ‘alcohol
problem that you don’t have, and therefore you can’t be a ‘binge drinker’ or
‘problem drinker’ or ‘risky drinker’ or ‘alcoholic’.
Think of my
research, where I was told by a group of people who had been drinking for
more than seven hours straight that their drinking wasn’t an issue because they
weren’t about to ‘kick off’ like some people would after two pints of ‘Stella’. Or those who said they weren’t ‘binge’
drinkers and behaved responsibly, but admitted in the same conversation that on
the way home from a night out they had set fire to several bins in a park.
This isn’t to condemn these types of drinking, but there’s
no question that they would be deemed problematic from
certain perspectives, and yet drinkers are able to dodge that classification by
pointing to others who are the real ‘binge’ or ‘problem’ drinkers.
I’d suggest this is the curse of thinking about ‘alcohol’
problems. As I’ve
written about addiction before, we can sometimes try to pin down an almost
infinite number of problems into one definition. In the case of alcohol, I don’t think anyone
is trying to get that
kind of elusive single definition of ‘alcohol’ problems, but the discussion can
still have much
the same effect.
As John Holmes
has
persuasively suggested, assuming that the aim of policymakers isn’t
abstinence from alcohol or prohibition, public policy would benefit from a
debate about what desirable drinking might look like. There’s a fundamental problem with that idea
in this context, though. An instant
liberal (or libertarian) response might be that it isn’t for government to
prescribe what desirable behaviour would be; instead it should proscribe
activity that is undesirable, defined as being harmful to others.
But in fact, if we’re trying to set strategic objectives, it
could
be seen as being (unusually for policy) harder to define what is
undesirable than what is desirable. The
problem is that even if we could define a single ideal of drinking (and mine
might well look different to yours), there would be an infinite number of ways
to deviate from this. It doesn’t get us
any closer to understanding that (a) drinking ‘risky’ amounts for health, (b)
alcohol dependence,
(c) ‘binge’ drinking, and (d) something that might be called ‘alcoholism’ can
all be different issues, with different causes, different effects and different
solutions. That’s by no means an
exhaustive list, and each individual will have unique circumstances, making the
‘problem’, ‘cause’ and ‘solution’ unique.
But more importantly for my original question of whether
it’s worth grouping issues together under the banner of ‘alcohol’, I’m not
convinced there’s a great deal to be gained by looking at dependency issues
alongside the public health concerns of drinking a bit more than guidelines,
alongside alcohol-related violent crime.
These involve different agencies, and different ‘solutions’.
At the risk of repeating myself, that approach offers us an
all-too-welcome way of avoiding admitting the problems we might have: at least
we don’t have that alcohol problem; which means, of course, that we
don’t have an alcohol problem at all.
And that goes for towns, cities and government departments, as much as
individual drinkers. With that in mind,
maybe there is some merit in having a crime strategy, a public health strategy,
and a substance misuse strategy. They
should all address alcohol-related issues, of course, but maybe there’s a
certain strength in disunity. I’d rather
try addressing the ‘alcohol
harm paradox’ by thinking about smoking, drinking, diet and physical
activity together, than by trying to link up alcohol-related violent crime,
recommended drinking guidelines and what should be prescribed for detox.
Friday, 1 April 2016
What do we mean by 'drugs'?
Last week I was at a
really interesting conference on psychoactivity and drug policy at Warwick
University, and was surprised and honoured to be speaking on the same
programme as the likes of Stuart
Walton and Toby Seddon.
(Unusually, I was also genuinely impressed by the publicity
they included in the conference pack – there’s
some great work in the humanities going on there.)
The theme of the conference was prohibition, particularly in
response to the Psychoactive Substances Act, which may or may not be
implemented in the next month or two. Given the media
coverage of the Act this week, I think it's timely to comment on some of the
discussions we had.
(Personally, I can’t see the government not implementing
this. Just because a
‘go live’ date hasn’t been set yet doesn’t mean the policy has been
abandoned.)
The position
of most people at the conference was opposition to ideas of
prohibition, whether from a libertarian or harm reduction perspective. For me, this debate centred on the
concept of ‘drugs’.
Fundamentally, many people’s opposition to current drug
policy is rooted in a feeling that it is unjust to have some substances legal
and others illegal, when there isn’t a great deal to choose between them in terms
of their inherent chemical or pharmacological properties. Why is alcohol legal and MDMA not? Chocolate and tobacco, but not cocaine and
cannabis? Julian Buchanan is a particularly
vocal exponent of this position, using the phrase ‘drug
apartheid’ to describe how some substances are considered consumer products
(tobacco, alcohol, etc), others medicines (methadone, morphine, sativa), and
others ‘drugs’ (heroin, cocaine, LSD).
At the conference, Toby Seddon suggested that, if we try to
understand what that last category of ‘drugs’ means, the only thing these
substances have in common is the way they are regulated. They don’t have similar origins, histories or
effects (in terms of either mind-alteration or health harm). He suggested that any attempt to prompt a
rethink of drug policy would need to question that concept of ‘drugs’, which
currently simply reinforces the ‘apartheid’, as Julian Buchanan would put it. If people keep referring to ‘drugs’, then
they’re using a category that only functions as a tool to maintain regulatory
distinctions between substances – precisely the distinctions they want to question.
An interesting presentation came from Kojo Koram, who offered a reminder of
how these distinctions can be entrenched.
The 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs uses the word ‘evil’
multiple times in its preamble (p.23 in the pdf here)
– a word that doesn’t appear in the comparable sections of conventions on
slavery, or even genocide. It is this
moral framework around ‘drug’ use that helps maintain the status of certain
forms of use (whether classified as pleasure-seeking, self-medication,
addiction or anything else) as problematic.
Stuart Walton argued that what is required is a public
challenge to these assumptions and this framework. Those in positions of influence should speak
and act in accordance with their beliefs while they are in a position to change
things; not simply afterwards, once they have safely retired or changed
jobs. And people regardless of their
power or influence should be open about their use of substances past and
present – as also encouraged by
Carl Hart – to help break that association between ‘drug’ use and ‘evil’.
My presentation was somewhat different, but focused on the
same ideas: that the concepts we use to understand policy are hugely
influential. Given the tone of the event
the night before and the conference itself was strongly against what was
defined as ‘prohibition’, and highly critical of the Psychoactive Substances
Act, I wanted to present some thinking that might be not simply critical, but
constructively critical (thinking of the
ever expanding list of rules of drug policy and Robert Maccoun’s suggestion
that “Experts like to have it both ways; we hold the government to higher
standards of proof than we apply to our own policy opinions”). I wanted to ask whether there could be a
sympathetic interpretation of the Act.
I’m not sure I entirely believe my own case, but I wanted to
offer a bit of nuance to the claims being made.
My point was relatively simple: ‘psychoactivity’ has replaced ‘harm’ as
the concept by which drug policy in the UK is justified. ‘Psychoactivity’ might not be easily
definable, but it is potentially more transparent and realistic than ‘harm’.
Before the Act, UK drug policy was structured around the concept
of ‘harm’, and this is still the organising principle for much reform activity
– the claim that we should legalise and regulate, or at least decriminalise,
‘drugs’ in order to reduce the harm to users.
The Advisory Council for the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) was there to offer
the government expert opinion about the relative harms of different substances,
which would consequently be controlled to varying degrees using the
classification system (Class A, Class B, Class C).
The
Act replaces ‘harm’ as a way of regulating substances with
‘psychoactivity’. Substances would no
longer be assessed based on their likely harm to users; they would be banned
regardless of harm if they were being bought or sold as having a psychoactive
effect. Of course this would in
principle ban alcohol, nicotine and caffeine (not to mention several other
substances) so explicit exceptions have to be made. Originally, I thought this might open out
discussion to consider why those substances are allowed and others aren’t – and
this has happened in public debate, but the government’s position hasn’t
changed.
But my argument in the conference paper was that this
position might actually be justifiable based on research from history and the
social sciences. First off, the idea of
‘harm’ from substance use is hugely complex.
It could be harm to others, through use of the substance
itself, as in passive smoking, or more indirectly through what
Liam Donaldson called ‘passive drinking’.
It could be harm to the user directly – but this could take a variety of
forms. It could be that there’s a risk
of death, or perhaps a risk of disability or sickness. And these risks could be from chronic exposure
to the substance, or from particularly severe or problematic acute exposure, or
particular patterns of use, or through combination with other risky substances
or behaviours. (Here I'm mostly
paraphrasing the discussions about alcohol harm at the
recent Alcohol Research UK conference.)
Interestingly, when we
think about drug deaths we tend to think about overdoses, while alcohol
deaths tend to be seen as due to chronic diseases, the result of heavy use
sustained over several years.
So you can see that any attempt to compare the potential
harm of different substances is fraught with difficulty. It will inevitably mean looking at a whole
range of factors, and weighting them against each other – as you can see from this
attempt by David Nutt and colleagues.
Just look at the sheer number of colours there have to be to identify
all those potential harms.
A further complication is that these harms aren’t guaranteed. As the Police are fond of pointing out in
relation to new psychoactive substances, using certain substances might be
described (if you’re prone to more than a little exaggeration) as ‘Russian
Roulette’. The key to this is the idea
of ‘risk’, the problem being that we humans aren’t terribly good at
understanding risk – as shown by the confused debate around the recent new
alcohol consumption guidelines. All this
means that it’s difficult to put a single number on the harmfulness of a
substance. And that shouldn’t be a
surprise to any historian or sociologist of drugs - though for a slightly
different reason.
Think of Howard Becker writing about
learning to get high from marijuana; Mary
Douglas talking about ‘constructive drinking’;
Norman Zinberg talking about drug, set and setting; MacAndrew
and Edgerton talking about ‘drunken comportment’; or Dwight Heath
on the anthropology of alcohol use.
All these authors note the importance of patterns of consumption and the
culture or learned behaviour around substance use in determining both practices
and harms. Of course this isn’t to deny
what might be called ‘objective’ effects or harms of substances; the point is
that how these translate into harms isn’t straightforward. When considering the likely harm of a
substance in a given society, we should be thinking about the norms around its
consumption.
This isn’t an original or blinding insight, but it is worth
remembering, as it means that policy can’t – or rather shouldn’t – really be
made on the basis of a purely scientific assessment of a substance’s properties. But what’s that got to do with
psychoactivity? Well, the way that
concept is applied in the Act is precisely how Toby Seddon or Julian Buchanan
would identify ‘drugs’ in policy discussions: it means all those things that
are illegal (or we want to be), since it explicitly excludes alcohol, nicotine
and caffeine from the category.
And maybe that’s justifiable, given the evidence around harm
and social context. There’s a legitimate
argument that given a society’s history and present circumstances, different
substances with ostensibly similar pharmacological properties shouldn’t
necessarily be regulated in the same way.
This is the thinking behind dividing societies into ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ in
relation to their attitudes to alcohol.
Some societies have developed stable ways of dealing with
well-established substances, but might not be able to have the same social
control over a new substance. I think
this is a simplification of the different ways in which we relate to alcohol,
but it's a pervasive model, and there should certainly be some acknowledgement
of the importance of social context to harm.
The point is, policy based on the sociological and historical research
on intoxicants wouldn’t necessarily apply a single standard to all relevant
substances. And a scientifically
determined concept of harm, based on the inherent properties of a substance,
wouldn’t be able to make these distinctions.
If people have quite different understandings of two very
similar substances, it’s reasonable to acknowledge those understandings as
misguided or irrational – but it would also be rational to control the
substances in different ways to take account of the different way people react
to them.
In practice, this is how the Government is using the concept
of psychoactivity: to designate substances the government thinks, rightly or
wrongly, we're not in a position to safely legalise, due to the social
context. (Or perhaps I should say,
they're not in a position to safely legalise, due to the political
context.) And based on the scientific, historical
and sociological evidence, there is a sense that psychoactive substances
have dangers (even alcohol is ‘no
ordinary commodity’), and, because of cultural factors, we can’t
treat all substances that have the same apparent level of psychoactivity or
toxicity in the same way.
This doesn’t mean that the UK government is right to ban
MDMA, LSD, nitrous oxide and a myriad of other substances. But it does make the apparent inconsistency a
coherent position. It is partly
historical accident (and as Virginia
Berridge and others would point out, a relatively recent historical
accident), but there’s no avoiding the fact that currently illegal substances
occupy a distinctly different position in our society to those longstanding
legal substances such as caffeine, alcohol and nicotine. Of course the fact that other substances have
been legal – or differently regulated – in the relatively recent past suggests
that it’s not unrealistic to imagine such a situation could be instituted
again. And that might not be a bad
thing. I’d hoped that those ‘disruptive
innovations’ of e-cigs and NPS might prompt a rethink of current drug policy,
and to a certain extent it’s disappointing they haven’t.
But to rail against the Psychoactive Substances Act as being
incoherent, inconsistent or hypocritical is not only to subscribe to a
naively rationalist view of policy, but also to neglect the hugely valuable
contribution of history and social science to the study of intoxicating
substances. We can't – and perhaps more
importantly shouldn't – rank substances according to some apparently objective,
unchanging, ahistorical notion of harm.
That's perhaps an oversimplification of what Nutt and
colleagues, and various campaigners have been trying to do, but I'd still
suggest that's the frame by which they justify their approach. And it's not only unrealistic; I'd suggest
it's actually undesirable as an ideal.
If alcohol isn't an ordinary commodity, new psychoactive substances are
even less so. So perhaps
‘psychoactivity’ in the new Act is simply a synonym for ‘drugs’ as colloquially
understood, as reflects the continuing influence of ‘drug apartheid’ – but we
should be careful of extolling the benefits of a pure, objective, rationalist
drug policy: there’s plenty of social research that suggests this wouldn’t fit
with how we actually understand and use different substances.
It may not be a perfect policy, but let’s not be too quick
to dismiss the Act as unthinking or arbitrary.
Maybe the Act, for all the critique, actually presents a more coherent
approach to drug policy than ‘harm’, which simply points to an apparent inconsistency
between legal and illegal substances.
Update 06-04-16:
You can hear me discussing some of these issues with Steve Harris of BBC Radio Solent on their 'Breakfast in Dorset' programme on the day the Act was meant to be introduced - but wasn't - here.
Update 06-04-16:
You can hear me discussing some of these issues with Steve Harris of BBC Radio Solent on their 'Breakfast in Dorset' programme on the day the Act was meant to be introduced - but wasn't - here.
Friday, 18 March 2016
Individuals, society and desirable drinking
I spent a great day on Wednesday at the
annual Alcohol Research UK conference.
There was a huge amount of evidence on show, and discussion about the
nature of evidence-based policy, how research can produce impact and shape
policy.
The discussion really boiled down to whether there could be
a common language, and genuine communication between researchers and
policymakers. There was consideration of
all the usual themes of academics being cautious about their conclusions, and
working over long timescales, where politicians want the 'killer' study that
gives them a definitive answer to a policy problem. In fact, there's a point to be made that
researchers too are looking for that perfect answer. We isolate factors, control for variables,
and try to identify causes.
Tom
Parkman got to the heart of things in the final session, raising the
question of whether alcohol was the cause of various problems, or whether the
drinking was the result of (for example) housing, employment or relationship
difficulties. He described this as the
'chicken or egg' conundrum, but that's really a shorthand for the fact that
these issues are mutually reinforcing – as he suggested, once problems are
established and chronic, is there any value in identifying which came
first? It might be more helpful just to
get on with an intervention that addresses problems as they stand now.
And actually researchers aren't great at this. We can trot out 'complexity', but still don't
often manage to move constructively beyond that to conclusions or suggestions
that are relevant to policymakers. It's
no good responding that things are more complicated than policymakers would
like, unless we can offer an alternative interpretation or proposal.
How do we represent that complexity? Often a quantitative study identifies the
specific contribution of alcohol to a 'complex' problem, as if then a
controlled intervention can singly address the alcohol issue, while some other
intervention or organisation deals with the bit that relates to housing, or
employment, or whatever else has been controlled for in a regression analysis.
Qualitative studies often conclude by metaphorically
throwing hands in the air and suggesting (correctly, but not always helpfully)
that 'it's a bit of everything'. The
problem is 'complex' or 'wicked'. And we
tend to invent our own terms to try to make sense of things. There's any number of typologies of drinking
patterns – but how have these been translated into interventions or policy?
Here's where the fresh eyes of a more quantitative team were
helpful. John Holmes described some new work
from the famous Sheffield
Alcohol Research Group analysing drinking diaries to identify particular
forms of drinking occasion, offering much-needed contextual data (but in a
systematic way) to the overall consumption data that tells us only amounts and
frequency. I can see their typology of
drinking occasions being genuinely useful – taking the work of Mark
Bellis' team to the next level. It's
an example of acknowledging the situation is complex, and can't be accurately
addressed with a single 'killer' answer, but still providing something that you
can imagine being communicated to a policymaker.
But John closed his presentation by raising another key
issue. We know that 'harm' isn't easily
defined, and we know that even if we do define it very tightly, we can't make a
totally straightforward link between consumption and that harm. We need that contextual information, about quantity
per occasion, and other factors such as whether food was present, family or
friends, and so on. That is, harm isn't
simply dependent on consumption levels; it's affected by drinking cultures.
So if we're not going to simply aim for prohibition or zero
consumption of alcohol – if we're prepared to accept, as most people in the
room seemed to be – that there could be positive, or neutral alcohol
consumption, we need to define what a 'desirable' drinking culture might
be. What 'should' policy be aiming for?
And in the context of references to sociology and social
anthropology, that makes complete sense.
There is no doubt that drinking 'cultures' affect harm, as well as
simply consumption levels. Sociologists
by definition are interested in studying society, as much as individuals.
But policymakers aren't all sociologists. The analysis doesn't simply translate into
policy, as we heard so often during the day.
In this instance, it's because of a frame that defines what is
appropriate for government to do. We
could argue over what a desirable drinking culture might look like, but that's
a second order question. First we'd need
to have agreement that government be in the business of fostering
'culture'. This would sit at odds with
Margaret Thatcher's reasonable (and selectively quoted) statement that 'there is no such thing
as society'. This plain statement
was actually very sensibly qualified by the observation that there are
individuals and families. This is really
a claim about the appropriate unit of sociological and policy analysis: should
we look at groups of people (who are only 'latent' classes, to use the
terminology of John's paper) or should we look at the individuals
themselves. (I'd quibble with Thatcher's
assumption that families are not a concept that needs unpacking, but that
doesn't challenge the overall approach.)
It is an unavoidably political discussion not just to define
what an acceptable drinking 'culture' is, but to even suggest that government
should be thinking at the level of 'cultures'.
Much as I'm sceptical of the utility of the term (although it's been
very useful in getting me publications in academic journals), this is a
questionable claim while (if?) we live in a neoliberal political
environment. According to that
orthodoxy, the unit of analysis is the individual.
And in fact, that's an appropriate place to end and bring
this post full circle. An individual, as
Bauman pointed out, originally means something that is indivisible. And that individual, as Tom Parkman's
research suggests, can contain plenty of interacting factors (housing,
employment, physical health, personal relationships, mental health, drinking
practices etc etc). But they are indivisible.
And, echoing Wulf
Livingston from Tuesday's symposium, perhaps that's where we should start
and finish: what does desirable drinking look like, not to policymakers, or
public health professionals, or academic researchers, but to drinkersand the
wider public themselves.
Saturday, 20 February 2016
Michael Gove, Power, and the EU
I don’t often blog on general themes of politics here. Mostly, I stick to issues relating to alcohol
and other drugs. That’s simply because
that’s the area I know best, on which I spend the most time. But the original purpose of the blog was to
discuss public policy issues where I felt there wasn’t clear debate.
I’ve
talked about university admissions before, but this time I’m going to touch
on the EU referendum. Not to get into
the substance; I simply don’t know enough about that. But to apply some relevant understanding I do
have (of political and sociological theory), to suggest that the debate risks
missing the point. I’m specifically
going to discuss Michael
Gove’s statement on why he will be campaigning for withdrawal from the EU.
The whole argument, it seems, comes down to his worry about
his own personal power. ‘It is hard to
overstate the degree to which the EU is a constraint on ministers’ ability to
do the things they were elected to do, or to use their judgment about the right
course of action for the people of this country.’
This might be a fair enough point, if it was making the case
that decisions should be devolved closer to the people they affect, and that a UK
minister is another step closer to the people of their country than an EU
politician. Certainly there’s a sense in
which the UK government has more control over UK policy than EU-wide policy.
And this is to some extent the fundamental issue: how small
should units of government be?
(On this point, Gove makes a disingenuous comparison with
the United States, suggesting that just as they fought for their freedom
through the War of Independence, we should take our freedom from the EU. Given the role and autonomy of states within
the union, a case could be made that in terms of distance from voters’ lives,
the federal government has in much in common with the EU as it does with the UK
government within that EU. To take
slightly flippant examples from my field, the legal status of different
substances, like cannabis, and the age at which you’re allowed to buy alcohol
vary by state in the US, and nation in the EU.)
But this question of how close power should be to citizens
betrays Gove’s simplistic approach to power.
This might well be a trick to make his argument more persuasive, but as
I write so often on this blog, that might be even worse than if he genuinely believes
what he is saying.
There is not, cannot be, and never has been a situation
where a minister in Whitehall – or any other person ‘in power’ – can issue
commands that are simply enacted. This
is partly because of ‘street level
bureaucrats’, who will actually be implementing any policy or diktat, but it’s
also because the idea of ‘control’ that Gove seems to envisage is impossible.
He states that ‘government is not, ultimately, in control in
hundreds of areas that matter’ – but this is not the result of the EU; it’s the
inherent nature of power. The EU is a
useful scapegoat, but no government has ever had ‘control’ of the economy, for
example. Even if it left the EU and took
back direct responsibility for setting interest rates, the UK government would
not be able to magically command employment, wages and growth rates.
But perhaps if Gove doesn’t mean controlling the outcomes of
policies, or even their implementation, he simply means ministers should have
autonomy in setting policies. In
reality, though, this too is a charade.
The world in which ministers could say ‘this is what our policy should
be’, and it could be implemented, is impossible. Their choices are constrained by a myriad of
factors, from international governments and corporations to sectional and
electoral interests at home.
Of course, that’s the nature of politics: to look at a range
of arguments and interests and come to a compromise. And it could be that’s the vision of politics
that Gove is aspiring to: his ministerial compromises will be better without
the institutions of the EU involved. His
judgement will be improved by making a political calculation about the informal
or putative constraints posed by the European context, rather than having
formal constraints already written out. (Of
course he’ll still have to pay attention to the European Court of Human Rights,
but that’s another story.)
In a sense, though, that’s less transparent for the
voter. If he can identify why he can’t
enact a particular policy (it’s EU Directive X) that might be clearer than if
he had to explain how that policy might spark a response from other countries,
and he’s calculated it’s not a risk worth taking.
But all this is a sideshow.
For all that central government talks of a new approach to governing and
commissioning that focuses on ‘outcomes’ and not processes, Gove’s thinking is
all about process. We should be having a
grown-up debate in which the EU is understood to be just one (unusually clear-cut)
constraint on ministerial decisions amongst plenty of others, and where there’s
an acknowledgement that in any case ministerial decisions have a long way to go
before they affect people’s actual lives.
Maybe then Brexit is the answer. It would remove what is often a diversion
from the real constraints and issues in politics, and might force politicians
to admit that Gove’s statement is truer than he would admit: ‘your government
is not, ultimately, in control in hundreds of areas that matter’.
That’s quite a price to pay for a ‘told you so’
feeling. This vote isn’t about simply
taking ‘control’. It is at best
opportunity to swap one set of constraints for another – and that makes it even
more important we talk honestly and openly about what those constraints are and
might be.
Wednesday, 3 February 2016
Thinking beyond population harm and addiction
I often mention on this blog the range of problems that are
associated with alcohol, and how this can muddy the waters when we try to
discuss alcohol policy: are we worried about violence and antisocial behaviour
linked to ‘binge’ drinking; health and social problems resulting from addiction
or dependency; or the risk of health harm due to long-term use?
I was reminded of this yesterday for two reasons: a neat diagram
I saw on Twitter from James Nicholls; and a
conference I attended discussing the links between intimate partner violence
and substance use, and how to address this.
James’ diagram showed a summary of how alcohol problems have
been understood and the dominant policy approach taken by campaigners – for example,
a belief in the 18th century that spirits produced a new and
dangerous type of drunkenness, and therefore that they should be specifically
controlled (and perhaps beer consumption encouraged instead).
The example given for policy today was that campaigners have
moved away from focusing on addiction as a disease (and therefore targeted
treatment as a solution), towards a preference for understanding alcohol
problems as being on a continuum, and the appropriate solutions as being
focused on the supply of alcohol (e.g. price and availability).
The only problem with this way of thinking (and I’m not
criticising James, just the public debate he’s analysing) is that if there’s a
whole continuum of alcohol-related problems, it seems odd to focus on
availability as the solution.
There is a strong argument that reducing availability
affects use and therefore to some extent the scale of social problems
associated with substances. A key reason
(though not the only one) why there aren’t that many heroin users in Britain,
and there are far fewer heroin-related deaths than alcohol-related deaths is
that it’s not as easily available.
(Of course heroin us isn’t as socially acceptable as alcohol
use, but again the two things (availability and a culture of consumption) are
linked: alcohol is available all over the place – and supported by politicians
as an industry – because it’s socially acceptable, but it’s acceptable (or
normal) partly because it’s so visible and available.)
But all that doesn’t mean that availability is the only game
in town; it’s certainly not what most drug campaigners focus on. Whether you have a relatively free market in
substances, one that’s reasonably well-regulated, or one based around
prohibition, you’ll still have people using substances who need some form of
help to reduce the health and social harm caused by their use. Current treatment services in the UK have
plenty of users of both alcohol and heroin.
You can call that level of use ‘addiction’,
or ‘dependency’,
or ‘heavy use
sustained over time’, or you might be thinking of ‘risky single occasion
drinking’ – and all those might describe genuinely different patterns of
use that imply a need for different sorts of support.
And that’s where the debate in the UK has fallen down. There’s a tendency to leap to see either the
substance (alcohol) as the problem, or identify particular people (alcoholics,
drunks, or whatever label is in fashion) as having weaknesses or
vulnerabilities to it. In the 20th
century stage of James’ model, although it isn’t seen as a person’s moral
failing, particular people are picked out as having a ‘disease’.
There’s always an issue around stigma, though, when you
focus on individuals. Kettil
Bruun argued that focusing on populations was a neat way to get around this
– and you could still implement interventions on this basis that were effective
for those most in need of help.
Some current commentators on substance use (notably Johann Hari) have tried to bypass this
debate by plonking down (without admitting it) the old sociological concept of ‘structure’
to replace the ‘agency’ of the individual who might have a problem. That is, it’s suggested that the problem
doesn’t reside in particular substances (and people often replace an ‘addiction’
to one substance with some other form of addiction – to activities like
shopping, sex or gambling as much as substances). Instead, with frequent reference to ‘rat park’, the wider social environment
is seen as the problem: people who have issues with substances variously need ‘jobs,
friends, houses’ or social ‘connection’.
In reality, this doesn’t get us out of the debate on whose ‘fault’
addiction is, as any sociologist who’s tried to write about structure and agency
would be able to tell you. (Don’t get me
started on Anthony Giddens and ‘structuration’.) The reality is bound to be more complex,
where some people’s issues will be primarily down to their social environment,
others a genetic predisposition, others simply to the risks inherent in alcohol
consumption, where they didn’t particularly have any other warning signs. Most are a combination of a whole range of
factors.
And this formulation still leaves us focusing on a
particular cohort of people: those who are (whether we use the word or not) ‘addicted’. And even if you’re not saying that individual
has a moral or genetic ‘failing’, there’s still something stigmatising about pointing
out which group in society is in greatest need of jobs, friends and houses, and
social connection – and there’s a danger this plays into certain
damaging narratives around ‘sink estates’.
When you hammer home the importance of wider social structure, there’s
not much ‘agency’ left to that individual to find meaning and stop feeling
powerless in their own life.
But what’s this got to do with intimate partner violence
(IPV) and yesterday’s conference?
Well, you can see the ‘jobs, friends, houses’ narrative as
having just the same aim as Kettil Bruun’s population-wide approach: make sure
resources are there for those who need them most. Only in this case, it’s a response to the
fact that the population-level approach seems to be shifting attention from those
with the least ‘recovery capital’ to those with the most: brief interventions
and universal efforts to reduce everyone’s consumption just a little bit. By reminding us of the need to focus
interventions on those who actually need jobs, friends, houses, we can target
scarce resources most effectively.
(I should point out that this is only my speculation on the
motives of some who’ve made these claims; probably not Johann Hari, who’s more
concerned about stigma and a more liberal drugs policy.)
But as we talk about jobs, friends, houses (I know it’s
getting tedious repeating that phrase) we’re really just talking about ‘addiction’
or ‘alcoholics’ in a new language. We’re
still focusing on one particular segment of a broader spectrum of
problems. And that poses a big problem
for some of the possible responses to IPV that were discussed yesterday.
It was pointed out that while programmes to treat
perpetrators of domestic abuse mostly run through criminal justice services,
only a small proportion of those who commit these acts come into contact with
the criminal justice system, and still less for these specific crimes, which is
how people come to be referred to these programmes. By contrast, a high proportion of those in
substance misuse treatment admit to having committed IPV (though they wouldn’t
necessarily see this as a crime, particularly where it doesn’t involve physical
abuse).
This is the logic for hosting such programmes within
substance misuse treatment services, or at least referring people through them.
And research with the partners of perpetrators that was presented
at the conference by Ingrid Wilson
suggests that alcohol is indeed closely related to IPV. (And I have to say I thought her model of the
stages of drinking and IPV was one of the best results of a grounded theory type approach that I’ve
seen.) But I’d suggest that the drinkers
described by their victims had more in common with ‘binge’ drinkers – or perhaps
those who engage in “frequent
occasions of heavy drinking that [also] result in heavy volume drinking”.
If we really think there is a continuum of harm in relation
to substances (and alcohol in particular), then we need to think of a full
continuum of interventions. And that
means having more nuanced discussions than we do now. Binary thinking might help frame some
discussions, and will win some arguments, but it can’t give the full picture,
or provide a complete answer.
Tuesday, 19 January 2016
In defence of alcohol guidelines
The last week or so has seen some pretty strong debate
around the
proposed alcohol guidelines published by the Chief Medical Officer. I’d sort of assumed that, like many news
events, this debate would be replaced by another issue after a day or so, but
in fact a
letters debate was still being printed in The
Guardian on Thursday 14th January – almost a week after the
guidelines came out.
This debate, as I
predicted when the guidelines were released, seems to have involved people
talking past each other, often from ill-informed or inconsistent positions. The letters to The Guardian are a case in point, so I want to spend some time here
talking their criticisms through.
I should start by acknowledging my personal position in
this, as I think this is important in how we react to guidelines. I drink between 20 and 30 units most weeks –
about 3 pints on each of Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday. (For those of you who are wine drinkers, this
works out at more than 2 or 3 bottles a week.)
I drank more than the ‘old’ guidelines, and I certainly drink more than
the ‘new’ guidelines, as the threshold for men has been lowered.
I often feel torn on alcohol issues. Thinking of
a similar discussion about older people’s drinking, you could say I took a
different position, challenging Jackie
Ballard on her assertion that older people’s health would inevitably be
damaged by increased levels of alcohol consumption. The evidence we’d just been presented with
flatly contradicted this point (which is a complete misunderstanding of the
nature of risk and uncertainty). There’s
also a danger that if you tell people a certain level of consumption will definitely
cause health damage they’ll switch as off, because they’ll probably know
someone who drinks at that level and hasn’t suffered any harm. That’s the nature of risk.
Equally, though, I’ve been quite supportive of the
guidelines released this week, which have had exactly the same objections
thrown at them. I value having them even
while I’m not exactly in step with their model of low-risk behaviour.
But I think this feeling of being unsure is appropriate –
alcohol can be both pleasure and poison, even at the same time. If we’re comfortable with a simple, coherent
position, we’re probably missing something.
More than this, though, there is a difference between
telling people what to do and giving them information. It’s exactly why I welcome the advice, but
don’t stick to the low-risk limits.
Jackie Ballard was wanting older people to drink less, and
wanting to tell them so, based on what I saw as a misreading of the
evidence. This is exactly what the Chief
Medical Officer and related researchers have been accused of in the past week
or so, but in fact I’d suggest they’re doing something quite different. They’re trying to offer information about
risk to guide individual decisions. (And
this information only related to medical risk – so you may wish to balance it
against the physical or social pleasures of drinking.)
14 units a week or less would be a good level for everyone
to drink at from a public health perspective, considering overall population
health outcomes like hospital admission rates, but it’s up to each individual
to judge whether that sort of health improvement is of any interest to them.
There seems to be a school of thought that thinks because
giving advice is difficult, we shouldn’t do it at all. That is, each person has different genetic
and environmental factors that will influence their level of risk, and so it’s
impossible to give a single risk figure for all people in the population, making
any single figure misleading.
But my response to this is that we use these single
approaches in all sorts of elements of life.
We set a single age of criminal responsibility (apart from in
exceptional cases), even though we know people’s maturity and powers of
reasoning vary considerably. We set a
single speed limit even though different cars and drivers have different
stopping distances. In terms of health
and lifestyles, we give single figures for recommended exercise or fruit and
veg consumption. I’m not saying these
are all the right way to approach these issues, but the idea of a single target
or recommendation is not unique to alcohol guidelines, or even unusual. It’s a standard approach to advising and
governing behaviour.
I would argue that if we’re making decisions that affect our
health, it’s helpful to know the best information possible about how that might
happen.
This is why I think the letter written by Jack Winkler,
Emeritus professor of nutrition policy, London Metropolitan University, is wrong
when it complains that we need a more complex response, ‘not just admonitions’.
In fact, it could be seen as dishonest to provide medical
professionals with tools by which to screen people for problematic alcohol
consumption, and then not give drinkers themselves access to the same
information.
One main argument – put forward by Sally
Caswell previously and Chris Hackley
more recently – seems to be that giving out limits puts the onus on the
individual to manage their own risk, and distracts from lobbying from more
effective controls on price, availability and so on.
As I’ve noted before
– and did when these guidelines came out – there is a genuine concern that recent trends in government
policy focus too much on individual decision-making, neglecting the wider
context that shapes these decisions.
(This is what is generally meant by neo-liberalism in a social policy
context.) So I’m sympathetic to the idea
that guidelines could distract from other elements of the alcohol policy
picture.
However, I’d draw attention to Nick
Heather’s response to this. The
simple answer is that if alcohol is legal and available in any form,
individuals will be making decisions about how much to consume and in what
format, pattern and setting. These
decisions unquestionably affect a person’s risk of health harm. And there is, unavoidably, a certain sense of
responsibility. This is not simply
‘victim blaming’, but an awareness that we make our own decisions, though not
always in circumstances of our own choosing (to badly paraphrase Marx).
But these letters to The
Guardian show that even making the research available alongside the
guidelines doesn’t mean it will be read and understood.
David Lewis from York writes that “The guidelines
conveniently ignore the evidence around the cardioprotective and
neuroprotective effects of moderate alcohol consumption.” They absolutely don’t. There’s careful discussion of this in the
Sheffield model, and that’s part of why the guideline isn’t set at zero despite
the fact that for many conditions there is no ‘safe’ level of consumption.
Dr John J Birtill from Guisborough in North Yorkshire states
that the guidelines “tell us nothing about how much longer the non-drinkers
will live on average, the range of this extra life expectancy, the quality of
life during the extra years, or the likely alternative causes of death. The
lifetime benefit of abstention might be rather small compared to the lifetime
pleasure of moderate alcohol consumption.”
In themselves, perhaps they don’t; they’re just low-risk
guidelines. And any condensing leads to
interpretation. But the report they’re
written into does talk about precisely these issues, and the Sheffield report
gives even more detail. These things
aren’t being hidden; they’re part of the discussion.
And the whole point of Millian liberalism is that the
individual is best placed to decide about their own ‘pleasure’ in various
activities, so it would be odd if the state stepped in and said this is where
the perfect equilibrium lies. This correspondent
seems to be objecting the fact that the state hasn’t done this, at the
same time as complaining that effectively it has. I’m confused.
Some of those writing in are clearly highly motivated to
find out about this issue, and highly qualified, seeing as they’re listed as
doctors and professors. And yet they’ve
failed to read (let alone understand) what’s already available and clearly
signposted. So what hope would the rest
of us (most of whom aren’t actually that interested in the detail) have of
finding out and understanding without providing these simple guidelines?
So I still can’t see what harm having guidelines does. And if we’re having them, what’s so wrong
about something that gives the
level at which you’re taking the same risk as the average car driver?
Sure, they don’t deal with all the myriad problems alcohol
can cause. And they won’t be effective
for everyone. And they aren’t the only
policy tool available.
But while alcohol is legal, isn’t guidance on risk something
a consumer should reasonably expect to be given? In fact, we even give this kind of guidance
about ‘safer’ consumption levels/patterns/settings with illegal drugs: always
use with other people; never share or re-use injecting equipment; smoke rather
than injecting; reduce your dosage after a period of abstinence; and so
on. Maybe alcohol users deserve the same
courtesy we grant users of other substances?
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