I’ve been reading quite a bit of fiction and non-fiction
about substance use and ‘addiction’ lately, and some of the latest things have
sparked me to wonder if we think carefully enough, or fundamentally enough
about the issues.
I’m going to focus here on David Courtwright’s new book The
Age of Addiction: How Bad Habits Became Big Business, but the points
apply equally across a lot of the debate currently. Although this reads a bit like a review, I’m
trying to make a broader point that we’re sometimes not as clear as we could be
about what the problem is and how we’re trying to solve it – and this is
important if we’re going to develop effective public policy.
Courtwright’s book is a whistle-stop tour through the
history of substance use, from prehistory and the development of agriculture
through to the industrial revolution and more recent developments such as
digital technology and online markets and interactions. Although not mentioned in the title of the book,
the argument hangs on a couple of key concepts.
He’s concerned with ‘vices’ and how something he calls ‘limbic
capitalism’ has made us more vulnerable to developing these.
Courtwright argues that there are parallels in the ways we
can get into trouble with different substances, whether we understand them as ‘drugs’
or not, and behaviours like sex and gambling.
What start off as being ‘pleasures’ can transform into ‘vices’ and
eventually ‘addictions’. In this way,
the book is about sugary food and drink as well as gambling as much as more
familiar issues grouped under the banner of ‘addiction’ like alcohol and other drugs.
Courtwright suggests that with industrial capitalism certain
pleasures became more attractive and available, as urbanisation fostered psychological
as well as geographical disruption. For
example, drink was more available in cities, you could indulge in pleasures
with less fear of judgement as there are more anonymous spaces, and you had
more reason to as there was less social connection and the work and living conditions
were less stable and rewarding. So the
industrial age was one of vices, not mere pleasures.
But Courtwright’s warning is that we have moved beyond this
form of capitalism and its associated vices to a new form – ‘limbic’ capitalism
– and the issues emerging deserve the label of addiction, not just ‘vice’. The word ‘limbic’ refers to the ‘limbic’
system, an idea Courtwright takes from the work of people like Daniel
Kahneman. The idea is that humans have two ways of acting: through rational
deliberation, making use of their ‘head’; and through more automatic
mechanisms, often labelled as a ‘gut’ reaction.
It’s the ‘limbic’ system that’s responsible for the latter. (Incidentally, I think Dan
Gardner is more relevant in this context.)
Thinking about these two systems is one way of understanding
the paradox at the heart of the concept of addiction: that we can knowingly act
against our best interests. When we employ
our ‘head’ to think about things, we know a particular course of action is
unwise, and we want to avoid it; but when, in the heat of the moment, we rely
on our ‘gut’, we make a mistake – or a ‘lapse’.
Courtwright’s contention is that capitalism today is
increasingly efficient at mobilising the ‘gut’ at the expense of the ‘head’,
meaning that ‘addiction’ is more common.
Examples include the formulation and marketing of unhealthy food and
drink and the design and delivery of computer games and social media through the
internet and mobile devices.
The elegance of the this argument makes it attractive, though
I would take issue with some of the claims.
I don’t want this to be a comprehensive book review, so I won’t go into detail
here, but I worry that this view idealises the past and misrepresents the nature
of addiction.
Prehistoric and agricultural societies were not innocent
worlds where ‘pleasures’ never transformed into ‘vices’ – and although that isn’t
what Courtwright is saying, there’s something about the argument that suggests
there was some golden age where we had our ‘guts’ and ‘heads’ in balance.
Crucially, the ‘gut’ and ‘head’ are not entirely separate and
we can’t quite explain ‘addictive’ behaviour in this way. Representing two systems like this risks
reproducing a Cartesian mind/body dualism, which has been critiqued to death. While a Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT)
approach to issues around substance use might take the approach of getting
people to actively reflect using reason, that isn’t quite the philosophy behind
other approaches that many people rely on, including Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). These approaches to recovery aren’t simply about
prioritising the ‘head’ over the ‘gut’; they’re about re-training your ‘gut’. Just as genetics and early experiences help
determine what ‘pleasures’ we are most vulnerable too, so we can ‘re-train’ ourselves
to form different tastes and habits. The
reflective can become automatic – so much so that the reformed smoker or meat-eater
can find the smell of cigarettes or frying bacon viscerally disgusting.
But in a sense that’s by the by for Courtwright’s
argument. It could still be claimed that
this is prioritising the ‘head’ in order to understand what is genuinely in our
best interests, and then we can use the ‘head’ to slowly turn round the ‘gut’. (I’m not quite convinced by this; encouragement
to fake it till you make it and just keep attending meetings don’t feel exactly
‘rational’, or something the ‘head’ can entirely justify.)
But more important than these details are the issues of language
and concepts. Courtwright isn’t exactly
clinical in defining what makes an erstwhile pleasure a ‘vice’ or ‘addiction’. I suppose he would say that a vice is an indulgence
in a perhaps fleeting pleasure where, at least in the long run, either you or
someone else around you is harmed, and this can be understood as an ‘addiction’
where there is some sense of compulsion.
And perhaps this lack of clarity is forgivable in what is
essentially a book outlining a grand narrative.
At some level my frustration with this is simply a matter of personal
style and preference. The sort of books
and authors Courtwright is drawing on don’t do a lot for me – Kahneman, Steven Pinker,
Yuval
Noah Harari, Thaler
and Sunstein and so on. For me, too
much gets lost in the grand sweep of the arguments, and they often include
errors or oversights.
But it’s also a question about the purpose of these
discussions (and these kinds of books).
Courtwright is writing because he’s concerned about trends in behaviour,
and the economic and political forces that are moulding these. The book ends for a call for us to avoid ‘excess’,
both in enjoying pleasures and in our politics.
(I’m sure some members of the
Drinking Studies Network would have plenty to say on this.)
Maybe it’s my personal baggage, but it all feels a bit ‘centrist
dad’, like a cry for us to grow up and become ‘rational’ adults. I felt like I was being told to drink less,
go to bed earlier, and probably vote Lib Dem.
The thing is, that isn’t necessarily ‘rational’ for
everyone. One person’s pleasure is
another’s vice. The key question is how to
define and police the boundaries between these categories of pleasure/vice/addiction. Can we?
Should we?
If this is a call for a return to classical liberalism, we
can’t be sure how we should regulate pleasure.
A reliance on single word like ‘excess’ cannot resolve the fundamental
tensions in liberal thought, even if we could all agree to call ourselves
‘liberals’. Think of TH
Green and JS Mill arguing in the nineteenth century about what the truly
liberal position on alcohol was.
When, where and how can lines be drawn defining competence, capacity,
freedom and harm? You might think I
drink too much, but who can genuinely judge that apart from me? What if I know the risks and I think what you
might consider ‘excessive’ is actually perfectly balanced?
This might sound a bit abstract and overblown, but I want to
illustrate that these are real, live and important issues for practice and
policy at the moment.
First, let’s look at some of the things Courtwright seems to
define as vices. For example, he seems
to worry about young people having no-strings-attached sex in the gap between
high school and college (p.203), which, in itself, I can see little problem
with. The devil is, of course, in the
detail of safety and consent – but that’s more complicated than condemning this
kind of experience in itself.
Oddly he worries: ‘Me-not-them remains a popular game. Try vaping instead of smoking. Try cannabis for pain instead of opioids …
Disney lobbied to keep casinos from competing for tourist dollars in its
Florida backyard. Yet it hired
sommeliers to recommend wines in its restaurants’ (p.231). None of these particularly worries me. They sound like reasonable, pragmatic
approaches that could well lead to more positive outcomes. I’m not unquestioningly in favour, but I’d
need a bit more persuasion from Courtwright to understand why each of them is a
bad idea.
Courtwright even seems to suggest that banning e-cigarettes
can be considered an ‘achievement’; a statement that itself would worry many
public health professionals, let alone liberals.
Behind each of these statements are fundamental questions
about what ‘the good life’ looks like.
Courtwright, for example, praises ‘mercantile and industrial capitalism’
for fostering ‘self-discipline, future orientation, and efficient time
management’ (p.210) as if these are all unquestionable virtues. As if they don’t exist on the same kind of
spectrum as pleasure/vice/addiction. Surely
not all those writing during the industrial revolution would have agreed with the
claim that ‘Innovation and competition, however fair and orderly, tend to make
the social consequences of improved production worse, not better’ (p.226).
He therefore also seems to dodge the implicit question about
the ethics of
‘nudging’ people into different behaviours, uncritically noting that certain
environments ‘work for us instead of against us’ (p.228). Who decides what’s ‘for’ us and what’s
‘against’? How?
At root, we have a view that emphasises the value of rationality. But there are two key problems with
that. First, there is no single
definition of a ‘rational’ decision. For
example, Courtwright states that when Zadie Smith gave up Facebook to help her
concentrate on writing a novel ‘She was wise to do so’ (p.209). Perhaps, but how can we know? And would we all be wise to do so? There are plenty of people who have been
inspired or supported by Facebook; even supported to give up their
‘addictions’. How can we develop a
general policy position on a medium like Facebook?
Second, constant rationality is not always productive –
either for individuals or societies.
There is a reason that feasts and holidays were endorsed by rulers and
ruled alike.
Is it that ‘vices’ hold real risks, or are they somehow
imagined? It seems to me that
‘self-control’ is valued not because the consequences of uncontrolled behaviour
are risky, but simply because they are (in some people’s eyes at least) somehow
irrational. Well indeed, that is
precisely the point.
Perhaps it could be argued that so long as not too much harm
is involved, then activities could still be classed as ‘pleasures’ (or perhaps ‘vices’)
rather than ‘addictions’. And yet if
they are not rational, how can they still be classified in this way? How can we then draw appropriate lines
between them?
If this still sounds like an abstract and indulgent academic
argument, think of how we regulate e-cigarettes, the night-time economy or
alcohol more broadly. If vaping is
somehow seen as a vice, not to be encouraged, this has serious implications for
public health and smoking cessation
policy.
If we are not able to define clearer boundaries between ‘vice’
and ‘addiction’, then we will struggle to support people who have issues with
heavy drinking. As health professionals wrestle
with the issue of why such a small percentage of people who drink heavily
access support, there are plenty of people suggesting that we need a more
nuanced approach to ideas of mental capacity and consent, arguing that, at a
certain stage, we can define heavy drinkers as acting so irrationally against
their best interests that they cannot sensibly be said to have mental capacity
to make informed, rational decisions about their own welfare.
Without clearer thinking and writing, we won’t get closer to
resolving these questions and developing policy solutions. David Courtwright has offered an interesting
and engaging contribution to the discussion, but for me he raised more questions than he answered.