This month, the think tank
Reform have published a report criticising public sector
commissioning. The title certainly
doesn’t mince its words: Faulty by Design.
Long-term readers of this blog will know I’m generally
pretty sceptical of these kinds of reports, and specifically the
work of Reform. Some of this is
natural defensiveness. When I read
sentences that state ‘commissioners … do not possess the necessary skills’
(p.11) I feel attacked personally. But
what I want to suggest here is that part of my frustration at these sorts of reports
is about something more fundamental.
(Before I move onto the fundamentals, though, I can’t resist
highlighting out the oddity of some points in the paper – for example where
they disapprovingly note that 72% of local authorities are planning to cut
substance misuse treatment budgets [p.23].
I’d love to know what the other 28% are planning to do, when public
health budgets are being cut by central government by 20% up to 2020, at which
point funding will reduce to zero. Or
when they note that services to address homelessness are ‘commissioned by a
plethora of providers’, when a provider is someone who is commissioned,
not someone who commissions.)
One of the recurring themes on this blog is that while
straightforward and honest thinking and writing – thinking to some purpose –
should be the aspiration of all those involved in politics and policy, humans
are complex, as is the world they make around them, and so
we shouldn’t imagine there are neat, perfect solutions that don’t require
compromise.
Without wishing to violate the first of those principles –
that I should be straightforward in my thinking and writing – I’d suggest that
the ontological and epistemological models of the Reform writers are naïve.
There is a section entitled ‘Not knowing what works’, which
is to misrepresent and simplify the mechanics not just of commissioning but
public policy more generally. Public
policy is not as simple as identifying a problem and then implementing a
solution. Any issue will be fused with
others, and any ‘solution’ will affect not only that one issue but those others
too.
And in any case, it’s not that commissioners don’t know
what works; it’s that this can’t be represented as an ‘intervention’, or even a
set of interventions, that can be managed as part of contracts. This model of ‘commissioning for outcomes’
imagines a world of unilinear causality (if that’s a phrase): somewhere we you
can pull a lever somewhere in the machine that is society, and then monitor and
note the effects. But society isn’t a
machine, and policies and interventions aren’t levers.
What ‘works’ in addressing substance misuse, for example, is
a complex mixture of housing, employment, relationships, education, and any
number of other factors that most people would simply refer to as ‘life’. No one organisation, no one ‘policy
intervention’ can produce the relevant ‘social outcome’, to use the language of
the report.
To be fair to the authors, they acknowledge that part of the
problem is that the social world is ‘extremely complex’. But they still conclude the section by
suggesting that there is a solution to this, and that it is ‘greater
development of the knowledge base and better dissemination of existing
expertise’, with the development of ‘what works’ centres seen as ‘a positive
step’ (p.14).
That is, the problem is framed as one of ‘knowledge’: if
only we did more research, we could develop the magic lever.
Instead, I’d suggest, we’d have better public policy if we
realised that striving for perfect knowledge is futile as there are no magic
levers, and the question we should be asking cannot be as simple as ‘what
works’.
As such, the approach of this report and others can feel like
a lament about the fact that the world doesn’t fit into boxes or categories, or
that people don’t behave in easily modelled ways. When the report complains of the reality of STPs (p.35), this isn’t the fault
of the idea of STPs, and it’s not something that a policy or structure can
address; it’s simply poor management and people not doing their jobs terribly
well. When, on the same page, the
authors describe the tension between ‘what works’ and what the voting public
want, we’ve got to the heart of the matter.
Policy isn’t, can’t be, and shouldn’t be, simply about ‘what works’.
And just as there no magic ‘intervention’ that ‘works’,
there is no ideal structure for public services. The report laments ‘the cost of
fragmentation’ (p.20), but the fact is that the idea of seamless integration,
or a definitive structure, is a chimera.
The cake has to be cut somewhere, and there are pros and cons associated
with every option. Anyone who has
observed health policy for more than four years or so will notice the incessant
back and forth of the size of administrative units. The grass may always seem greener, but it’s
as if people are actually hankering after flowers that even the greenest of
grass won’t produce.
A case in point is public health. The report complains that locating public
health departments in local authorities ‘has stood in the way of integration
elsewhere in the NHS’, but equally locating its ‘prevention’ function in the NHS
would hamper its ability to shape key influences on health that sit within
local authorities, like transport, housing, planning, licensing, schools, and
so on.
Fundamentally, there is no ideal policy on this, and yet the report
uses the word ‘integrated’ as if it simply means ‘good’ when there will
inevitably be choices of what and how to ‘integrate’, and there will be pros
and cons to any approach. Setting aside
the fact that ‘the NHS’ doesn’t really exist as an institution for a department
to integrate with, we’d have to acknowledge that public health departments can either
be ‘integrated’ with local authorities or ‘the NHS’ – unless of course you’re
planning ‘integration’ of the whole set of public services. But rather than cutting the Gordian knot,
this would create one, with different strands of complexity inextricably linked
to one another. And even in that extreme
example there would be a dividing line: we’d still have to decide what elements
of life are ‘public’ and what ‘private’.
But at points in the document it really does seem that the
authors imagine a world without boundaries or departments – of otherworldly
‘integration’. In fact the language is
oddly spiritual, suggesting public services should ‘transcend’ current service
boundaries (p.25). I can only assume
they are imagining an all-encompassing ‘service’ (or ‘intervention’?),
‘commissioned’ presumably by some overarching ‘public commissioner’ – a
leviathan of the police, community safety, social care, healthcare, transport,
and so on ad infinitum.
To go back to a cake metaphor, it might seem like I’m having
my cake and eating it – that I’m asking the impossible of the report’s authors
as I criticise them for failing to provide a solution to a problem I think is
intractable by definition. But that’s not quite what I mean. I’m criticising
them for noting the complexity of the world and attacking commissioners for
simplifying it, before they go on to simplify it in their own way, which is no
more intellectually or practically justifiable.
Life is complex, and can be understood and arranged in an
infinite number of ways. None of these
ways is perfect, and the reality is simply hard work on the ground, not a
magical policy or structure being delivered by government, policymakers or a
think tank.
The report presents the idea of integrating health and
social care (which is already an article of faith of STPs and the
Better Care Fund) as if it is groundbreaking or will make all the
difference, rather than focusing on the fact that this kind of development is
simply difficult and requires hard work.
There is no structure or approach that makes it easy.
And this is where my real unease with these think tank
reports lies. They always feel like they
are written by ‘policymakers’ or ‘wonks’, rather than people who actually have
to commission, design or deliver these services.
There can be ‘integration’, but it won’t come from breaking
down departmental boundaries or fiddling with commissioning budgets. There will never be a single department or budget
where savings across every social policy field can be identified and pooled.