So the government has 'shelved' minimum unit
pricing (though Public Health England still insists it's under
consideration, but won't tell us how - that would be a
matter for the Home Office).
This isn't really a surprise, as it was clearly hinted at
by Anna Soubry on 2nd July, and then basically confirmed on 12th. And further back, the government had clearly
already cooled on the subject even before the
idea was excluded from the Queen's Speech earlier this year.
The government has instead gone back to the idea of a ban on
selling alcohol 'below cost' - i.e. below the cost of duty and VAT - originally
promised in the Coalition's Programme
for Government. This is despite
saying just over a year ago in the Alcohol
Strategy: "We do not currently intend to implement a ban on the below
cost sale of alcohol (defined as Duty + VAT)." But then this was also the document that
said, unequivocally, "We will introduce a minimum unit price (MUP) for
alcohol". MUP could be said to be
the policy centrepiece of the document.
Yesterday, David Cameron said the new (or should I say old)
proposal was 'effectively
a minimum price'. Indeed, Jeremy
Browne's statement is careful to frame the measure in these terms: "It
will no longer be legal to sell a can of ordinary strength lager for less than
about 40 pence."
Now, setting aside the point I would make in an academic
setting (that it says something about the views of this government that they
chose lager as the illustration), this sparked me thinking about what is
different between the two proposals: MUP vs below cost pricing.
MUP has been rejected because the government does "not
yet have enough concrete evidence that its introduction would be effective in
reducing harms associated with problem drinking, without penalising people who
drink responsibly". However, if
there's insufficient evidence about MUP, surely there's also insufficient
evidence about setting what's 'effectively' MUP?
In fact, if we take at face value the
statement from the Home Secretary that the measures are to 'curb excessive
drinking', it seems clear that there's less
evidence that a below cost ban will 'work'.
Today, the Sheffield
Alcohol Research Group that did the modelling on MUP that's often cited have published a clear
comparison of MUP and the below cost ban.
The evidence of the model* is that public health benefits of BBCS, as
they call it (Ban on Below Cost Selling), would be tiny compared to MUP at 45p.
It's for this reason that the decision has been branded 'disgraceful',
for example.
There's obviously something else going on here.
MUP is generally understood by public health campaigners as
in line with a population model (explained by James Morris here). That is, reduce everyone's consumption by a
tiny average amount, and the difference to any specific individual in terms of
risk might be almost negligible, but when you add all this up across a
population, you get a noticeable fall in the total harm.
However, this is not how the government has portrayed
MUP. Generally, it has been presented as
a targeted policy. The 2012
Alcohol Strategy was very clearly presented as dealing with 'binge'
drinkers, with the Prime Minister's foreword beginning and ending with a
reference to them. It is in this context
that the promise of MUP was introduced, with an explicit reference to problems
caused by 'pre-loading' (drinking alcohol bought from a supermarket/off-licence
before you head out to a pub or club).
David Cameron on
another occasion explained that MUP was a way of stopping families with a
'reasonable drinking habit' subsidising 'binge' drinkers.
I don't really know what this difference in understanding of
MUP is caused by. It could just be a way
to 'sell' the policy to a wider public, using 'binge' drinkers almost as a
cover. It could be a genuine belief that
this is how the policy could or should work.
It might, perhaps most plausibly, represent genuine confusion. Or maybe it reflects the kind of wishful
thinking that seems to dominate alcohol policy discussions: that despite the
fact that there's a myriad of 'problems' associated with the substance,
somewhere out there is a single policy or initiative that can deal with them all. The debate around MUP seems to have taken
this form, with it being seen as the solution to all ills.
I don't think this representation of MUP is any kind of
cover. I would suggest that the
government genuinely believes that alcohol-related issues are caused by an
'irresponsible minority', and that those with a 'reasonable drinking habit'
should be largely left alone. The idea
of a 'reasonable drinking habit' as something that should be seen
sympathetically would certainly grate with a public health view of the world.
If this is true, then the government's ideal policy would
not be population wide but something that's targeted. And duty on alcohol is targeted (if in a slightly bizarre way), varying by drink type. A key example of this is white cider, which
is considered to be a particular problem by the government - so much so that legislation
was introduced in 2010 in order to define it as a separate drink. If my calculations are right, the below cost
ban would make 3 litres of Frosty
Jack's £7.65, compared to £2.75 in 2010, according
to the Daily Mail. Meanwhile, a bottle of wine will still be
able to be as low as something like £2.20.† This is precisely the sort of targeting that
I can imagine the government being in favour of.
UPDATE 18-07-13
John Holmes of the Sheffield team has informed me that in fact Frosty Jack's isn't taxed at the spirits rate. That makes me confused about what exactly the 2010 duty change can possibly be doing. I'm trying to find out what on earth its point is now by the questionable mechanism of Twitter.
UPDATE 18-07-13
John Holmes of the Sheffield team has informed me that in fact Frosty Jack's isn't taxed at the spirits rate. That makes me confused about what exactly the 2010 duty change can possibly be doing. I'm trying to find out what on earth its point is now by the questionable mechanism of Twitter.
In light of its shelving of standardised packaging for
tobacco as well as MUP, the government is currently being characterised as in
hock to big tobacco and alcohol, symbolised by Lynton Crosby's lobbying
connections. Just like with the
Labour debates around union funding, I think it's a lot more complicated than
that.
This could be linked to broader ideas of neoliberalism, and
I think this helps understand where the government is coming from. The targeting of individuals comes from the
same place: the fundamental approach to government is that market forces should
be allowed to roam free, and undesirable outcomes that arise are the fault of
flawed individuals, rather than flawed structures.
I've said before
that there's a reason big tobacco gives to think tanks like the Adam Smith
Insitute: it's not so much that they'll be easily swayed by the cash; it's more
that they're already inclined to agree with the idea that the tobacco industry
(like almost all others) should be free to operate in a largely unregulated
market.
Similarly, at the moment both Coalition parties are led by
individuals with a fundamental belief free market principles, and I'd suggest
that the idea of banning below cost selling fits more neatly with a free-market
worldview than a minimum price (above this level). Of course in other contexts loss-leading is
considered a legitimate tactic within the market. But then maybe this could be justified by
saying that alcohol is no
ordinary commodity. (The distinction
here seems to be more one of an impression rather than substance, as the
practical difference between the two interventions seems marginal.)
So my conclusion is that MUP has been shelved because the
government simply doesn't have a public health philosophy (in terms of defining
either the problem or the solution) and it is ideologically defaulted to
protecting the free market and targeting apparently problematic individuals.
(As with the issue of the industry funding think tanks, we
probably get closer to the heart of the Lynton Crosby issue if we start with
the fact that Cameron is the sort of person who would hire a person like Lynton
Crosby, who has all these sorts of alcohol and tobacco industry links.)
For public health campaigners this might seem like an
unfortunate blow. However, I want to end
on a positive note, so I'll make two points.
First, public health concerns aren't the only issue in
alcohol policy, as
I've said before, and so we shouldn't expect them to trump everything else
- and we should remember that MUP wouldn't have been a panacea for all
alcohol-related issues in any case.
Second, and somewhat flippantly, it's nice to know that the
population-wide model doesn't always win out at the expense of targeting. One of my roles is in commissioning drug
treatment, and the general approach of this - targeting a few thousand
individuals in an area, rather than a few hundred
thousand - sits somewhat
at odds with the public health population-wide model. Targeting can sometimes be helpful. Unfortunately, it can also be stigmatising - but that's something for my
next post.
*Some representatives
of the alcohol industry would want me to point out that this isn't
really 'evidence' according to their definition, as it doesn't look at
something that's actually happened - it's 'only' modelling.
†This is
based on the figures on p.7 of the Sheffield
report, which give spirit duty+VAT as 33.9p per unit, and wine as 24.5ppu,
assuming 9 units in a bottle of wine and 22.56 units in a 3l bottle of Frosty
Jack's.